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Reviewed by Sameer M. Ashar
In The Global Clinical Movement, Frank Bloch and his co-authors set out to 
document a movement to “transform legal education into justice education” 
(xxcvi). The volume captures the work of a group of committed and 
passionate legal educators. The authors, drawn largely from the organization 
Global Alliance for Justice Education (GAJE), view clinical legal education 
as a key component of justice education. Their global documentation project 
is ambitious. Bloch has assembled an impressive group of authors with 
experience developing clinical programs at over forty-three law schools on six 
continents. The programs range from street law to externships to live-client 
clinics, and have been initiated at the behest of students, funders, faculties, 
and administrators. Eight chapters in the opening part survey clinical 
programs by region. A ninth chapter takes up the question of whether clinical 
legal education can be viewed as a form of “legal imperialism.” The next 
part of the volume is comparative, as authors sketch out cross-cutting themes 
with particular focus on the justice mission of clinical programs. The final 
part surveys the conceptual connections and institutional networks that cross 
borders. Bloch and N.R. Madhav Menon, the latter of whom started the first 
law school clinic in India at Delhi University, name this cluster of relationships 
among law faculty a “global clinical movement,” implying dynamic, cause-
driven growth.
This is one of the first books focused exclusively on descriptions of 
clinical legal practice. It offers an opportunity to think coherently about law 
school clinics as a subset of public interest law. In addition to the descriptive 
ambition underlying the book, Bloch and his collaborators make key choices 
in the construction of the project. They include descriptions of programs from 
countries in both the global north and global south and give the accounts 
equal weight. The chapters, in more than a few cases, are co-written by 
clinicians with roots on different continents, which creates opportunities for 
comparative analysis both within and across chapters. The book exhibits a 
clear understanding of the complexity and variation within clinical practice; it 
includes dedicated chapters on externships and street law, in addition to the 
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descriptions of live-client practice within law schools. Finally, Bloch and his 
collaborators demonstrate a generous and aspirational spirit as they attempt 
to unearth transformative justice education from current practices. They do 
not accept globalization as it is but rather project a form of globalization as it 
ought to be, linking lawyers, law students, and clients across lines of economic 
and political inequality in a common project to ameliorate injustice and elevate 
the rule of law. 
I believe that the book is a significant achievement and one with consequence 
and meaning throughout legal education and the legal profession. Perhaps 
its greatest virtue is to open up space for analysis and discussion of clinical 
legal practice outside of the boxes in which it has been put up to this point. 
Bloch and his collaborators offer the possibility that we think about law 
schools clinics as something other than pedagogical sub-units of law schools. 
These chapters begin an essential dialogue about the meaning of the spread 
of clinical legal education across borders as a phenomenon in and of itself. I 
argue here that the meaning of this programmatic spread remains uncertain, 
contingent, and contested. Indeed, this volume should cause us to question 
the contested meaning and purposes underlying clinical legal education at 
law schools both within and outside of the United States. I argue for thick 
description of the content of clinical work and the contexts in which clinics 
operate. The goal of subsequent scholarship in this area should be to develop 
taxonomies of institutional form that allow us to assess and further develop 
clinical legal education. Second, I argue for nuanced description of the 
movement of people and ideas across borders so as to understand more fully 
the relationships between clinics in different parts of the world, as well as to 
consider how clinical legal education fits within larger theoretical frameworks 
in the field, such as law and development theory. Third, I argue for a theory of 
justice education that captures the dynamics between experiential education, 
legal education, legal profession, and civil society and nation. I contend that 
making law clinics and law schools more permeable to social movements 
ought to be a central strategy in the development of justice education both in 
the United States and abroad.
Taxonomic Description and Conservation
Naturists classify species on the basis of rules and relations. Taxonomy 
reveals biodiversity, as well as relationships between species over time and 
across space. Conservationists rely on taxonomy to preserve biodiversity, 
particularly in circumstances of limited resources. As clinical legal education 
spreads and complicates itself as a result of both indigenous and exogenous 
factors, we would benefit from systems of classification that define institutional 
manifestations in the field. We should be able to relate new variations to older 
institutional forms so as to reveal both path dependence and productive 
differentiation. We need a better understanding of how exogenous factors—
such as the demands of governments, university administrators and funders, 
student-consumers, and the private bar—may extinguish some institutional 
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forms and promote others. We need to learn to dissect our own motivations 
and institutional impulses as well, as we survey the field.
Perhaps embarking on a documentation project outside of the United 
States is only appropriate. Particularly for U.S.-based legal educators, going 
abroad has the lure of starting over and promoting particular institutional 
forms outside the tangle of entrenched beliefs and systems within U.S. legal 
education. Perhaps we can see institutional forms and relations more clearly 
abroad than at home, where what we do defines and limits how we see. 
The question that The Global Clinical Movement raises is whether those who are 
responsible for the creation and development of clinical programs will be able 
to effectively classify those institutional forms in a larger taxonomic system and 
whether they can unearth the external and internal factors that have come to 
define each program. Erika Castro-Buitrago, Nicolas Espejo-Yaksic, Mariela 
Puga, and Marta Villarreal, in their chapter on clinical legal education in 
Latin America, make the best case for an affirmative answer to this question. 
They productively draw on the law and development literature to historicize 
the rise, fall, and rise again of law school clinics in four countries in the region. 
They are particularly interested in the fate of what they call public interest 
law or PIL clinics, characterized by commitments to progressive social change 
projects, cause-based lawyering, and collaborations with non-governmental 
organizations. PIL clinics developed in response to critiques of reigning 
schools of legal education and practice. “These clinics charged directly against 
the formalist approach to law, focusing on public law issues such as free speech, 
minority rights, due process, human rights, treaty enforcement, and other 
issues related to democratization and the rule of law. They worked initially on 
strategic litigation, attempting to connect law schools with both social issues 
and new theoretical challenges for legal theory”(70). Unfortunately, some of 
the book’s descriptive chapters do not historicize clinics in this way and lack 
thick description of the legal work undertaken by faculty and students.
Because of the intensely local, contextual foundation of legal work, to have 
meaning across radically differing contexts we need to be able to understand the 
content, aspirations, and outcomes of programs. We need some understanding 
of the politics that encourage and inhibit various institutional forms across 
national and local contexts. To either generalize without linkage to models of 
legal work or to get lost in specificity and singularity undermines comparative 
projects. We need to know enough about legal practice in the various settings 
to understand how it might constitute a model of work that is shared across 
borders.1 An accurate taxonomy requires thick description of work and a 
1. Frank Bloch and Mary Anne Noone propose the following as categories of classification:
Many clinical programs that are concerned primarily with increasing individual 
access to legal services adopt an “individual service” model. This is an open-ended 
approach to legal aid, handling a variety of cases—and as many individual cases 
as possible—limited only by external considerations. A “specialization” model, 
by contrast, seeks to provide legal services in a particular area of law, often to a 
specifically targeted group of clients. A “community” model is oriented toward a local 
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better understanding of the intentions and design choices made by clinicians. 
By looking outward from U.S. shores and analyzing a range of institutional 
forms, The Global Clinical Movement encourages us to look more intently at the 
content of our own work and the continuities and discontinuities across 
borders and across programs. It begins a process through which we may derive 
new rules of description and methods of classification and that might lead to 
other comparative studies of law school clinics. Taxonomy has the potential 
to provide a clearer picture of programmatic forms, preserve institutional 
diversity, and provide the tools by which we might fight to preserve certain 
forms, most likely against the powerful forces roiling legal education.
Globalization and Neoliberalism
Up to this point, the global clinical movement has emerged from the bottom 
up; groupings of local programs come together to start a national movement, 
programs scattered around the world come together to start a global movement 
(275).
Without some better understanding of these processes, we are likely to see 
our growing foreign contingent simply as a recognition and legitimation of 
the essential goodness of our own commitments and strategies in favor of 
progressive change.2
These descriptions of programmatic spread across borders offer two 
contrasting conceptions of its meaning. It seems to me that both conceptions, 
at least partly, describe the growth of clinical legal education outside of the 
United States. Clinical legal education is not yet produced dialogically through 
the joint and equal contributions of clinicians within and outside the United 
States. Some of its growth is attributable to U.S. foundation funding and 
the decision of visionary U.S. clinicians to seek new frontiers in institutional 
development abroad. To be sure, their equally visionary collaborators have 
independent motivations for the pursuit of this project, including but not 
limited to meeting a dire need for legal advocacy, integrating a justice mission 
community and utilizes a range of approaches—including organizing and community 
legal education—to address that community’s legal needs, broadly defined (158–59). 
While I appreciate the impulse to classify, how would one define a clinic that provided direct 
service in a particular area of law on the basis of need as defined by community organizations? 
There seems to be a fair amount of overlap between the categories set out by Bloch and 
Noone. It may be that some of the classifications that we employ on a regular basis within 
clinical legal education—big versus small cases, individual versus impact, access to justice 
versus social change—are rooted in models of practice that no longer reflect current reality. 
The danger is that these classifications might justify and entrench path dependence, or even 
more harmful impulses, such as the inclination to prioritize governments, administrators, 
funders, and student-consumers over clients and communities. See, e.g., H.B. 751, 430th Sess. 
(Md. 2012) (proposed bill mandating that state-funded law school clinics only represent “an 
indigent individual”). 
2. Bryant G. Garth, Law and Society as Law and Development, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 305, 313 
(2003).
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into the expansion of legal education in their home countries, and raising their 
own status within their own institutional-political contexts.3
Do the mixed motivations of the initiators and developers of global clinical 
legal education matter? I think they do for two reasons. First, it matters for 
the sake of descriptive accuracy and classification—the case I made above. It 
matters whether clinical models are being wholly transplanted, modified, or 
created anew in contexts outside of the U.S. It is important to acknowledge 
both generalized and specific influences in the development of programs 
without conceding that clinics constitute a new form of “legal imperialism.”4 
Taxonomies depend on an accurate understanding of relations between 
institutional forms. An over-commitment to a counter-imperialist, bottom-
up narrative of clinical legal education across borders scuttles the effort to 
accurately classify, evaluate, and conserve.5 
A second reason this matters is that without an accurate map of relationships 
between people and institutions in sending and receiving countries, we cannot 
fit this “movement” into larger theoretical frameworks of globalization. The 
Global Clinical Movement presumes a strong normative commitment to social 
justice and justice education shared across clinical legal education. However, 
law school clinics both within and outside of the U.S. operate in complex 
3. See Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, 
Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States 208–19 (Univ. of Chicago 
Press 2002) (on the incentives for business lawyers in Mexico to engage with U.S. law firms 
and market initiatives).
4. Scott L. Cummings and Louise G. Trubek map the complexity inherent in the spread 
of global public interest law, which in their account includes clinical legal education: 
It is not the case that public interest law emerges organically around the world; rather 
it is “constructed,” which means that there must be actors at both the global and local 
levels, who have a stake in its development and are willing to make investments in public 
interest law and institutions. The process of construction implicates competing values 
and visions of legal change: the motivations of funding institutions or government 
officials may diverge from those of lawyers and activists on the ground. And it also 
implicates questions of national autonomy and identity: while some lawyers may 
embrace public interest law as a way to contest governmental and corporate abuse, others 
view it as an unwanted American export, a tool of social control that dissipates political 
conflict through legalization or displaces more emancipatory forms of legal resistance. 
Globalizing Public Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 1, 4–5 (2008).
5. Again, Cummings and Trubek note—and subtly critique—the need of advocates 
of globalized public interest law to root programmatic developments in the local: 
Yet privileging the local produces its own tradeoffs. There is the risk of 
romanticizing local efforts and minimizing the global role of outside funders. 
There is also the more complicated question of how the legacy of U.S. imperialism 
may impact long-term efforts to build transnational alliances and promote 
informational exchange . . . . Going forward, it is therefore crucial that lawyers 
across the North-South divide continue to frankly confront the history and 
current reality of U.S. power, while also attempting to move beyond distrust 
in order to open up the possibility for transformative alliances across borders. 
Id. at 43.
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contexts and within contingent opportunity structures. The work that just 
about all need-based clinics do in the U.S. is to fight the most extreme instances 
of governmental abuse of power and to process individual cases of people 
seeking redress from state or market actors. Other than the example of PIL 
clinics in Latin America and two case studies of community-based advocacy 
in the chapter by Daniela Ikawa, it appears from The Global Clinical Movement 
that programs abroad are replicating the individual representation model that 
prevails in law school clinics in the U.S. If so, Bryant Garth’s concern about 
the integration of international scholars in the U.S.-based Law and Society 
Association offers a cautionary analogy as we assess the meaning of the spread 
of clinical legal education:
Legal idealists confident of their own good intentions—and fortified with 
professional ideology that celebrates those intentions—want to fight on the 
side of justice. They look for their potential counterparts abroad, listen to their 
explanations about their own idealistic intentions to put law in the service of 
good causes, and then naturally support and celebrate those counterparts.... 
We seek to remedy the inequities of U.S.-style globalization by offering more 
of our favored brand of U.S.-style globalization.6
The danger is that we view the spread of clinical legal education uncritically 
and that we advance the project with less awareness than we should have about 
its implications in new contexts.
David Trubek and Alvaro Santos recently characterized the current era as 
the “third moment” of law and development, following an initial state-centered 
period in the 1960s and 1970s and a period of market-focused neoliberalism 
in the 1980s and 1990s.7 The third moment is meant to encapsulate legal 
regimes that remain market-oriented but that also account for the critiques 
of neoliberalism rooted in concerns about human rights, labor rights, and 
environmental stewardship. Clinical legal education fits nicely in a “third 
moment” analysis. Clinics, with variations over time and across borders, 
are civil society institutions that, in the service of human rights initiatives, 
leverage resources allocated primarily for the production of legal workers 
trained to serve powerful private interests. The law and development frame 
also explains dynamics in the growth and retreat of clinical legal education 
and an opportunity structure that is external to the enterprise while it is 
simultaneously shaped by the actual work clinics undertake. For example, 
the PIL clinics in Latin America appear to invite suppression by undertaking 
projects that fundamentally challenge private power or states captured by 
such interests. Another interesting example from The Global Clinical Movement is 
the differing orientation of law school clinics in Apartheid-era South Africa. 
6. Garth, supra note 2, at 312–13.
7. Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of 
a New Critical Practice, in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 
1–18 (David M. Trubek & Alavaro Santos eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) [hereinafter 
The New Law and Economic Development].
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Programs at outlying English-language law schools focused on social impact 
and activism against the state, while the Boer-language law schools and law 
schools funded by the state for the black elite focused on skills acquisition 
(27).8
An alternative means by which to examine this “third moment” law and 
development dynamic is in terms of the spectrum of rights development and 
enforcement activity, from traditional civil rights and civil liberties at one end 
to economic and social rights at the other. When clinics move from civil to 
economic (or from negative to positive rights), opportunities for institutional 
growth recede, even in the relatively safe harbor of private power-reinforcing 
legal education programs. The role of the state or its civil society proxies in 
protecting people from the vagaries of the market is no longer felt or presumed. 
Institutionally, the contained development of clinical legal education offers 
an illustration of the constraints placed on civil society institutions buffeted 
by market forces during an era in which the state balances between policy 
considerations and interest groups.9
There are more than a few instances globally in which civil society institutions 
and social movements—of which the institutions are both a manifestation and a 
target10—are able to leverage slight concessions by state and market opponents 
to further mobilize, build power, and gain wider concessions.11 Even if a law 
school clinic is part of a neoliberal rule of law project, it is not fated to either 
remain toothless or to wither and disappear. However, it remains essential 
that we understand how these institutions succeed in redistributing power in 
a particular context to replicate success, to avoid pitfalls and to contribute to 
the development of new theoretical frameworks, including future iterations of 
law and development theory. It is also essential that we understand how the 
transplant or transmission of elements of U.S. clinical legal education works. 
Does it create openings for social change in new host countries or does it shut 
down avenues of mobilization and empowerment? The Global Clinical Movement 
8. According to David McQuoid-Mason, Ernest Ojukwu, and George Mukundi Wachira, in 
their chapter on Africa, “[t]he liberal universities in apartheid South Africa primarily tried 
to assist the victims of apartheid, while the universities that supported the apartheid regime 
tended to focus on practical skills.” Titi Liu similarly identifies a tension within clinics 
between skills training and social justice in her analysis of public interest law in China. 
Transmission of Public Interest Law: A Chinese Case Study, 13 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign 
Aff. 263, 281–84 (2008) (“On the whole, the law school clinic programs have developed to 
focus on professional training, making it difficult for clinical legal education to achieve any 
norm-setting potential.”).
9. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in The 
New Law and Economic Development, supra note 7, at 19–73.
10. See Robert C. Hockett. Institutional Fixes Versus Fixed Institutions, 39 Cornell Int’l L.J. 537 
(2006).
11. See generally Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality 
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2005).
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initiates this inquiry but does not complete it. It sets up an important agenda 
for the future documentation of the work of law school clinics.
Justice Education and Social Movements
It is certainly true that the spread of clinical legal education results in more 
social justice, especially for individual poor clients who would not otherwise 
have access to legal advocacy. But the deeper spillover effects of law school 
clinics on legal education, legal profession, and civil society and nation are 
highly contingent and uncertain. It is thought that bringing law students 
“face-to-face with the society that the law serves” alters legal education in a 
fundamental way (272). The “direct and meaningful personal experience of 
addressing pressing local social needs” leads law students toward a commitment 
to similarly situated clients and the tackling of social problems over the course 
of their careers (272). “Clinical programs based in legal aid clinics encourage 
students to examine how the legal system works to disempower certain 
groups and to become involved in law reform activities”(163–64). Although 
the systemized, direct, and personal experience of law students with poor 
and marginal clients is undoubtedly a social good, I question whether such 
interaction leads to the transformation of legal education and lasting social 
justice. 
For Bloch and Menon, an education in legal skills training and professional 
responsibility fits alongside experiential education for social justice (268–69). 
They propose two spillover effects: from the clinical curriculum—defined by 
the actual work that law students do in clinics—to clinical methodology, so that 
the transmission of professional skills leads to a commitment “to provide legal 
services to the poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged” (270). The second 
spillover effect is from law school clinics to the rest of the curriculum: “[a] 
key element of clinical legal education is its commitment to shifting the focus 
of student learning from the classroom to the real world, particularly when 
students are required to deal with real-life situations in a legal aid clinic…. 
Interests are cultivated, attitudes are developed, skills are imparted, value 
clarification is provided, ethical decisions are made, and confidence and 
responsibility are experienced” (271). This passive rendering of the transmission 
of normative commitments through law school clinics calls into question the 
presumptions embedded in the spillover thesis. In light of the worsening crisis 
of inequality in the U.S. in the 40 years since the founding of modern clinical 
legal education and the continued growth of the number of those without 
access to legal advocacy, it is challenging to feel assured about our ability to 
steal progressive values into legal education and the legal profession, beyond 
the actual work undertaken by law school clinics.
In a different but highly relevant context, Matthew Stephenson labels these 
kinds of efforts “Trojan horse” strategies.12 In the case of U.S. efforts to stimulate 
the spread of the rule of law in China (including, presumably, clinical legal 
12. A Trojan Horse in China?, in Promoting The Rule Of Law Abroad: In Search Of Knowledge 
191 (Thomas Carothers ed., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2006). 
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education), he shows that academic and foundation proponents believe that 
“legality will prove, like the [I]nternet, uncontrollable” and that “legal 
reforms will spread throughout the system,” hidden from the government.13 
The problem is that authoritarian regimes, such as modern China and fascist 
Spain, have been quite adept at co-opting legalism so as to protect property 
and contract rights without reaching the human rights issues that are the core 
concern of many in the sending countries.14 The Chinese government is able to 
“cordon off and control politically salient sections of the legal system.”15 In the 
end, the Trojan horse may be turned back on the sending forces in a double 
switch that weakens long-term efforts to alleviate suffering and elevate human 
rights enforcement.
A theory of justice education espoused by progressive clinicians relies upon 
the following suppositions:
Cause Spillover effect
Professional skills training à Commitment to individual clients
Commitment to individual clients à Commitment to solve social problems
Commitment to solve social problems à Transformation of legal education
Transformation of legal education à Transformation of the legal profession
Transformation of the legal profession à Transformation of civil society/nation
To be fair, Bloch and his collaborators make a more limited case for the link 
between law school clinics and justice education in The Global Clinical Movement. 
Their aspiration for clinical education is that it will alter the trajectory of legal 
education, a spillover effect that has been felt widely at law schools within 
the United States. My broader concern is that there are too many “double 
switches” that may turn back the Trojan horse on clinicians seeking to advance 
justice education. A focus on professional skills, particularly in the context of 
a contracted job market, may cause students to forgo social justice concerns 
in favor of their own individual development.16 Service to individual clients 
13. Id. at 203.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 206.
16. On the basis of data from the After the J.D. longitudinal study of the professional lives of 
lawyers in the United States, Rebecca L. Sandefur and Jeffrey Selbin do not find support 
for the proposition that enrollment in law school clinics leads to higher levels of pro bono 
service or civic participation. The Clinic Effect, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 57, 93–97 (2009). They do 
find limited support for the idea that clinics are an “accelerant” for civic-minded students to 
obtain public service employment after law school, but it is unclear whether this relationship 
is causative or correlative. Id. at 97–100. The delinking of clinics from justice initiatives is 
particularly likely in stratified systems of legal education, such as in the United States and 
India (48). Elite schools may support extensive clinical programs and provide privileged 
students with opportunities to engage in social justice work. Other schools may differentiate 
themselves by dispensing with justice education initiatives and promoting skills training for 
law students underrepresented in the profession and with less academic preparation.
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under prevailing interpretations of the rules of professional responsibility may 
discourage lawyers from representing grassroots organizations and groups of 
poor or marginalized clients.17 Social justice values may be promoted by law 
schools in the hothouse of their clinics without altering the focus of the rest 
of the curriculum on the representation of relatively powerful private interests 
(76).18 Pro bono efforts to serve clients and undertake public policy initiatives 
may preserve and strengthen elements of the legal profession that protect 
private interests of wealthy individuals and corporations.19 Clinical legal 
education may be the Trojan horse that fails to disturb and sometimes even 
promotes subordination through law.
Daniela Ikawa calls for more complexity in the horizontal relationships 
between law students and clients and putting law students in the role of social 
engineers “with responsibilities that go beyond interpreting the text of the law 
and beyond the search for favorable judicial decisions to encompass the search 
for deeper knowledge about reality—and for social change” (201). The Latin 
American PIL proponents argue that the clinics they describe “tried to avoid 
a naïve belief on swift transformation of legal education and also assumed the 
limited—although not less important—possibilities of structural social change 
via legal activism” (70). Collaborations with social movements and grassroots 
political organizers encourage deep critique of oppressive systems and the 
development of skills that characterize democratic lawyering.20 It is vital for the 
preservation of the justice education ideal that clinics bring social movements 
into the center of the law school experience. This is even more emphatically the 
case in many of the regions profiled in The Global Clinical Movement, where social 
movements have a rich history and have made a great impact on societies. It 
is only when movement activity is as significant as market participation in law 
school curricula that justice education might stand a chance of altering the 
trajectory of profession, society, nation and world.
17. See Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 Clinical L. Rev. 355 
(2008).
18. As Erika Castro-Buitrago and her co-authors note, “In this respect, [legal clinics in Chile] have 
tended to be both conceived and implemented as a way to exhibit—to the legal community 
and the public in general—some sort of educational method that may add symbolic value to 
the program offered by law schools. Legal clinics have not, however, become a fundamental 
part—not even a significant one—within the process of legal education reform.” 
19. See Scott Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (2004).
20. See Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 1383 
(2009).

